Fear of losing access
Messages threaten to lock you out of the account you need to do your job today. That makes you act before you check.
This short course is required for everyone at Charitybuzz. It takes about ten minutes: a few focused lessons, a quick quiz, and a confirmation that goes on your training record. Everything in it comes from the kinds of messages and requests our team is actually receiving, so what you learn here is what you will use at work.
Your Charitybuzz Google account is the key to your email, Drive, calendar, Slack sign-in and the files we share with bidders and nonprofit partners. If an attacker gets in, they can read everything, send messages as you, and use your name to push scams on colleagues and partners.
Account-takeover attacks are not clever hacking. They are a fake page or a fake alert that gets you to hand over the password or approve the prompt yourself. They work because they look routine: "your password expires today", "new sign-in from a new device", "storage is full".
A fake Google "password expires" message. Click every detail that should make you stop. There are 6.
Hi Jordan,
The password for your Charitybuzz Google Workspace account expires today. If you do not act, your account will be suspended and you will lose access to Gmail and Drive.
Click below to keep your current password.
You may be asked to approve a sign-in on your phone or enter the 6-digit code to confirm it's you.
Quick check: for each address or situation, decide whether it is a red flag or looks fine. Real Google sign-in pages live on accounts.google.com.
https://accounts.google.com/signinThe real owner of the address is google.com, and the sign-in page lives on the "accounts" part of it.
https://accounts.google.com.session-verify.net/signinRead from the first "/" backwards: the real owner is session-verify.net. "accounts.google.com" is only a name the attacker put in front.
https://sign-in-google.com/workspaceA hyphenated look-alike. Google never asks you to sign in on a site that merely contains the word "google".
A 2-Step Verification prompt appears on your phone, but you have not tried to sign inSomebody has your password and is trying to get in. Deny the prompt and tell John. Never approve a prompt you did not start.
A caller says they are "Google support" and asks you to read out the code just texted to youThat code lets them into your account. Google will never ask you to read out a verification code.
You type accounts.google.com yourself and it asks you to sign inYou went there on your own, which is exactly the safe way to sign in.
Messages threaten to lock you out of the account you need to do your job today. That makes you act before you check.
Real sign-in alerts and expiry reminders exist, so a fake one does not feel strange. The page is a copy of the real one.
A short deadline makes verifying feel like a risk in itself.
Attackers who already have your password send many approval prompts, hoping you will tap "Yes" just to make them stop.
Account-takeover attempts that aimed at a company like ours look like these:
A message says your Charitybuzz password or Google account is about to expire or be suspended and asks you to sign in through a link to keep it active.
Your phone shows a sign-in approval prompt you did not start, or several in a row. Soon after, someone calls or texts "from IT" to say it is a mistake and asks you to approve it.
A message claims to be from Google Workspace about storage, billing or a suspended user and asks an admin to sign in and "resolve" it.
Real alerts can be checked by visiting the site yourself. You should never need the link.
Look at the very start of the address before the first "/". Hyphens and extra words mean it is a different site.
Used to push you to act before you think.
Real account notices give you time and a way to check independently.
Someone already has your password. Deny it.
Verification codes are for you alone. No one legitimate asks for them.
Being asked to sign in again "to view" something is a common trick.
Google and Charitybuzz IT do not call to ask you to approve or read out anything.
Treat every sign-in link in an unexpected message as untrusted, however real it looks.
Type myaccount.google.com in a new tab. Check Security → Recent security activity and Your devices.
If a 2-Step prompt appears and you did not just sign in, tap Deny and tell John.
No one needs your verification codes, not Google, not IT, not a leader.
If you have one, use it. They work only on the real site, so a fake page cannot capture them.
Use Gmail's Report phishing, and let John know.
Go to myaccount.google.com → Security, change your password, then open Your devices and sign out any you do not recognize.
In Gmail settings, look for forwarding addresses or filters you did not create, and tell John what you find.
In Gmail, open the message, click the ⋮ menu and choose Report phishing. Then email [email protected] with a one-line summary of what you did (clicked, opened a file, typed a password, approved a prompt). Fast reports let IT block the sender for everyone.
From a device you trust, go to myaccount.google.com by typing it yourself, change your password, and review Security → Your devices. If you reuse that password anywhere else, change it there too.
This is the most urgent case: the attacker may already be in your account. Contact Charitybuzz IT ([email protected]) right away so they can end every session and reset access.
Don't keep working on that device and don't try to "clean it up" yourself. Leave it on, disconnect it from Wi‑Fi if you can, and contact IT.
This creates the completion record Charitybuzz keeps for compliance. Please use your work details.
Your completion has been recorded. Thank you for helping keep Charitybuzz, our nonprofit partners, and our bidders safe.
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